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Plessy's Ghost: Grutter, Seattle and
the Quiet Reversal of Brown
D. Marvin Jones*
I. INTRODUCTION
II. THE RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK
III. CONCLUSION
"Cartoonist Gary Trudeau's genius is the truth his characters speak.
The earnest young man from the law school's development office exudes
liberal angst, but rather than the expected excuses and euphemisms, he
simply says, 'We no longer admit black people. ""'
I. INTRODUCTION
Affirmative action is dead.
The evidence abounds in the unmistakable and systemic decline in black
enrollment in the nation's colleges and law schools. 2  Such evidence is
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law, J.D. New York University, 1976.
I. Charles R. Lawrence Il, Two Views of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of
Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 928, 928 (2001) (italics added).
2. See generally D. Marvin Jones, When "Victory" Masks Retreat: The LSA T, Constitutional
Dualism, and the End of Diversity, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 15 (2006). As John Nussbaumer writes:
The total number of African-Americans enrolled at all ABA-approved law schools
peaked in 1994 at 9,681 students, which at that time represented 7.5% of all enrolled
students .... From 1994-2004 ... total African-American enrollment decreased from
9,681 to 9,488 students (-2%), which represents just 6.8% of all enrolled students.
John Nussbaumer, Misuse of the Law School Admissions Test, Racial Discrimination, and the De
Facto Quota System for Restricting African-American Access to the Legal Profession, 80 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 167, 168 (2006).
There is anecdotal evidence from recent news reports that enrollment is down at undergraduate
colleges all across the country. See Black Enrollment: A New Challenge; Decline in Black
Freshmen at U-M, Elsewhere, Reason for Concern, GRAND RAPID PRESS, Dec. 6, 2004, at A6. The
decline is especially obvious in states where either referenda have passed limiting the use of race or,
as is the case in Florida, where state law prohibits the use of race in admissions. See Black
Enrollment Still Falling In Universities, SUN SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2005, at 6B. The author notes a
decline in black enrollment at the college level in Florida:
New figures show fewer black students are attending Florida universities than in the past
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equally apparent from the Supreme Court's resounding rejection of
voluntary affirmative action in the Seattle, Washington, and Louisville,
Kentucky, school districts.' And it is evident in the ominous success over
the last five years of conservative legislation, like Governor Jeb Bush's One
Florida4  and the Ward Connerly anti-affirmative action referenda in
California5 and Michigan.6 Affirmative action was a ladder. It allowed
generations of blacks, from Clarence Thomas to Barack Obama, to climb up
out of the socio-economic well and become important members of society.
What seems ironic is that the systemic decline in black enrollment in
law schools and the success of legislation hostile to affirmative action is
taking place in the shadow of Grutter v. Bollinger.7 In Grutter the Supreme
Court held that promoting racial diversity was a "compelling" reason that
seven years. Six of the state's II public universities reported a drop, and the percentage
of blacks in this year's freshman class is at its lowest since Bush became governor. The
decline comes despite continued growth in the overall student population, a 3.1 percent
increase to nearly 282,000 students ....
Id.
3. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
4. "On November 9, 1999, Governor Jeb Bush signed Executive Order 99-281 as part of his
'One Florida Intiative.' Executive Order 99-281 eliminated the use of 'racial or gender set-asides,
preferences and quotas' in government employment, state contracting, and higher education."
Michelle Adams, Isn't it Ironic? The Central Paradox at the Heart of "Percentage Plans ", 62 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1720, 1743-44 (internal citations omitted). Bush's "proposal was subject to intense
opposition from its inception." Id. at 1745. One Florida resulted in lower enrollment of Blacks in
Florida's universities:
Black freshman enrollment at the University of Florida is expected to be down by nearly
half this year under Gov. Jeb Bush's ban on racial preference in public university
admissions. Blacks represented nearly 12 percent of the freshman class last year, but the
class starting this month will be only 6 percent to 7 percent black, said officials at the
state's most elite public university.
'One Florida' Cuts College Enrollment of Blacks, CNN.COM, Aug. 13, 2001,
http://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/2001/fyi/teachers.ednews/08/13/minority.enrollment.ap/index .h
tml.
5. Introduced in 1996 as a California ballot proposition, Proposition 209 amended the state
Constitution to prohibit a "public university system" from "discriminat[ing] against, or grant[ing]
preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race . . . [or] sex .... " CAL.
CONST. art. 1, § 31(a), (f). Like what occurred in Florida, this so-called colorblind policy had a
devastating impact on minority admissions:
The Berkeley campus of the University of California . . . was forced by California's
Proposition 209 to switch to race-blind admissions. Underrepresented minorities in the
student body dropped sharply, from 25% to 11%. At the University of Texas School of
Law, the number of black first-years fell to just four the year after the school was ordered
to adopt race-blind admissions-from 38 the year before.
Adam Cohen, Coloring the Campus, TimE, Sept. 17, 2001, at 48.
6. Lose in court? Take it to the ballot box. Michigan opponents of affirmative action were
defeated in the judicial system but called on Ward Connerly to help them win voters, COLOR LINES
MAGAZINE, Jan. 2007, at 6.
7. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). See Monica Bansal, Groups Challenge Michigan Affirmative Action
Referendum, CNSNEWS.COM, Oct. 13, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp?Page=/
Nation/archive/20061 0/NAT20061013a.html.
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justified Michigan's consideration of race in the law school admissions
process. 8 Grutter was hailed by "both liberals and conservatives as a great
victory for affirmative action." 9 The Supreme Court of the United States
placed its imprimatur of constitutionality on diversity as a compelling
interest of the state. People of color won the battle! Hurrah. Yet,
resegregation is taking place in the midst of "victory."
This article is about why this is happening. I argue there is no irony
here: Grutter is a very conservative framework at war with the project of
affirmative action. Grutter is not a victory, but a defeat in disguise. Prior to
Grutter, a series of cases, from Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. in 198810 to
Hopwood v. Texas," developed the rule that race was an impermissible
consideration. The only exception was where it was necessary to consider
race in order to remedy a legal wrong: identified discrimination. 12  The
underlying notion was a contractarian view of equal rights: the right of the
individual to equal treatment could not be sacrificed in order to achieve a
perceived social good. 13 The problem for the civil rights community is that
this framework perpetuates a terrible socio-economic gulf. Because Grutter
allows diversity-a social goal-to stand as justification, 14 many scholars
received this as a crack-if not a back door-in the wall the court was
building. It was not.
First, I wish to show that the current debate we are having is a debate
which has its roots in reconstruction. We are, in my view, simply witnessing
the end of the second reconstruction. It all begins with the debate over the
8. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 ("Today, we hold that the Law School has a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body.").
9. Jones, supra note 2, at 16.
10. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding unconstitutional a state regulation requiring contractors
awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty percent of the work to minority-
owned businesses).
11. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a state university law school admissions program
that gave minority applicants substantial preferences violated Equal Protection).
12. See J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 497; see also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 942.
13. See JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 505-06 ("To accept Richmond's claim that past societal
discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to
competing claims for "remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group .... We think such a result
would be contrary to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision whose central command is
equality."); see also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945 ("[T]he use of race in admissions for diversity in
higher education contradicts, rather than furthers, the aims of equal protection. Diversity fosters,
rather than minimizes, the use of race. It treats minorities as a group, rather than as individuals. It
may further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may promote improper racial stereotypes, thus
fueling racial hostility.").
14. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
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reconstruction Civil Rights Acts and culminates with Plessy v. Ferguson.15
During this era two models of equality emerged. One model I trace to
Lincoln 16 and another model I trace to Georgia Senator Joshua Hill. 7 I refer
to these models of equality as "equality as redemption" and "equality as
imposition." Plessy, as I see it, simply places its stamp of approval on the
philosophy of Joshua Hill. First, I will show the continuity between the
concept of equal protection that was used to rationalize segregation in Plessy
and the concept of equal protection in the Croson-Hopwood1" line of cases.
There are uncanny parallels. Second, I will show that Grutter is the alter
ego of the Croson-Hopwood cases. Finally, I will address the question Gary
Orfield asked in a recent article' 9-whether the law the Supreme Court has
been writing is imbued with the spirit of Brown20 or the ghost of Plessy-in
light of the Court's latest affirmative action case, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 2 1 I write to show how
that ghost, the ghost of Plessy, pervades the law of affirmative action and
pervades both the Grutter and Seattle cases.
II. THE RECONSTRUCTION FRAMEWORK
Equality is not a fixed star, but a constellation of concepts and
narratives.22 During the first reconstruction, a framework for equality
emerged from the struggle to not only emancipate blacks, but to eradicate
the philosophy on which slavery rested.
Slavery rested on the notion that blacks were not citizens and were not
intended to be citizens.23 As I stated in an earlier conversation, because
slaves were property, because they were entities without rights, the statuses
of slave and citizen were, by definition, mutually exclusive.24 If the legally,
15. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding the constitutionality of segregation on the grounds of
"separate but equal").
16. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
18. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
19. See Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream, or Plessy's Nightmare?,
The Civil Rights Project-Harvard University (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.
ucla.edu/research/resegO4/brown5O.pdf.
20. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning Plessy and abolishing segregation
in public schools).
21. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (holding unconstitutional school districts' "student assignment plans"
that relied on racial classification "to allocate slots in oversubscribed high schools").
22. Law is authoritative largely based on claims of objectivity-"The rules laid down."
Narrative is persuasive in large part because of the moral claims it makes. I argue that despite its
claim of being perspective-less, much of law, particularly in the Constitutional context, relies on
moral and or ideological claims for its persuasive power. The purpose of this essay is to limn out the
political narratives that have defined the boundary between two competing notions of equality.
23. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-421 (1856).
24. See generally D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self
Jou
[Vol. 35: 583, 2008] Plessy's Ghost
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
artificially created status of slave was the only rationale for the dichotomy
between slave and citizen, the whole scheme of master-slave relations would
be tautological and without foundation in reason. 25 Thus, if blacks could be
citizens, the legal bonds that bound white masters and slaves in their
respective places could potentially unravel.2 6
Justice Taney in Dred Scott addressed this problem by finding that
blacks were, for all intents and purposes, an inferior order of human life.27
Because of their inherent inferiority they were not citizens and could not be
made so.
Blacks had for more than a century been regarded as beings of an
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior that they had no rights that the
white man was bound to respect. Thus the negro might justly and lawfully
be reduced to slavery for the white man's benefit. The negro was bought
and sold and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic
whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed
and universal in the civilized portion of the white race. "It is not a power to
raise to the rank of a citizen any one.., who ... belongs to an inferior and
subordinate class. 28
The era of reconstruction was defined by an effort to eradiate this view:
"The term reconstruction, in the civil rights context, is a shorthand
description of the legal, political, and social efforts to eliminate slavery and
the racist legacy of slavery captured in the Dred Scott philosophy.
29
Lincoln prophetically and perfectly articulated the concept of equality
that would charter the era of reconstruction to follow. He said: "As I
would not be a slave, so I would not be a master .... Whatever differs from
this ... is no democracy.,
30
82 GEO. L.J. 437 (1994).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05, 409-10. To be sure, Taney attributed this view of
inferiority to the Framers rather than himself Id. at 405; see also Jones, supra note 24, at 464 n.108.
But original intent in Taney's terms is the arbiter of constitutional meaning. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S.
at 409-10. The proposition that blacks "are inferior" was a "fact" for purposes of constitutional
interpretation. Id. at 404-05, 408.
28. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 418 (emphasis added).
29. Robert Belton, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Future of Affirmative Action: A
Preliminary Assessment, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1085, 1092 (1992).
30. Document by Abraham Lincoln (Aug. 1, 1858), in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 532 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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There is here a sense of an imperative, perhaps a democratic imperative,
to break with the slavocratic past. While the term "racial caste" may not yet
be part of the lexicon, the logic of Lincoln's argument clearly extends
beyond slavery to any institution of domination of one race by another. I
call it redemption because Lincoln clearly saw freedom for former slaves as
the defining characteristic of democracy. The concept of redemption is
deeply bound up in freeing those who are in bondage. 3'
By positing an antithesis between democracy and slavery, Lincoln did
not speak philosophically. He was making a political statement rejecting
Dred Scott, and in so doing, he redeemed the nation from the "wrong" of
that infamous case. Lincoln logically went beyond slavery. Carrying his
idea to its logical conclusion, Lincoln articulated an anti-caste notion of
equality.
3 2
Lincoln's exhortation against the Dred Scott philosophy crystallized into
law in the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, which begins with
the statement, "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . .,,"
The Supreme Court in the Slaughterhouse Cases3 4 articulated another
aspect of this substantive notion of equality-an affirmative duty to protect
the former slaves:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found [in all the amendments], lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we
mean the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly
exercised unlimited dominion over him. 5
31. Redemption has at least two aspects. One aspect has to do with liberation: "For freedom
Christ has set us free; stand firm therefore, and do not submit again to a yoke of slavery." Galatians
5:1 (English Standard Version); see also Exodus 6:6, where the Jews are "redeemed" from bondage.
"Redemption," I feel, also connotes a notion of getting one's freedom through sacrifice. In the
Christian tradition, it is Christ's sacrifice, which "frees" us or redeems us. Redemption seems to fit
here because Lincoln was saying we must "give up" slavery in order to achieve democracy.
32. The phrase "anti-caste principle" orginates with Cass Sunstein. See Cass R. Sunstein, The
Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410 (1994). The same idea, however, was articulated earlier
by Owen Fiss. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFAIRS 107, 127 (1976) (arguing that equal protection proscribes legally entrenched socioeconomic
castes under a "group-disadvantaging principle" or "antisubjugation" principle). I think the concept,
though not the phrase, traces back to Lincoln.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
34. 83 U.S. 36(1872).
35. Id. at 71.
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The words of the Amendment, it is true, are prohibitory, but they
contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity, or right,
most valuable to the colored race-the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored:
exemption from legal discriminations that imply inferiority in civil
society and lessen the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations that are steps toward
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.36
The Slaughterhouse interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment echoes
Lincoln: for the Court, domination of former slaves by whites-the problem
of caste-is inconsistent with the new Constitution created by the enactment
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.37 Also, it is key
that the Court described blacks as "citizens" and "freemen." I posit that
citizens and freemen are categorical opposites of "subject race." Equal
citizenship is the promise at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
government has an affirmative duty to guarantee this.
The same framework of affirmative duty to protect equality as full
citizenship is explicit in Strauder v. West Virginia.38
The true spirit and meaning of the amendments, as we said in the
Slaughter-House Cases, cannot be understood without keeping in
view the history of the times when they were adopted. At the time,
when they were incorporated into the Constitution, it required little
knowledge of human nature to anticipate that those who had long
been regarded as an inferior and subject race would, when suddenly
raised to the rank of citizenship, be looked upon with jealousy and
positive dislike, and that State laws might be enacted or enforced to
perpetuate the distinctions that had before existed . . . . Their
training had left them mere children, and as such they needed the
protection which a wise government extends to those who are
unable to protect themselves. They especially needed protection
against unfriendly action in the States where they were resident. It
was in view of these considerations the Fourteenth Amendment was
framed and adopted. 9
36. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879).
37. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII-XIV.
38. Strauder, 100 U.S. 303.
39. Id. at 306.
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Strauder underscores with a rhetorical hammer the importance of
historical context. 40  The opposite of textualism or rigid formalism, the
Court spoke in terms of lived experiences of blacks as victims of
discrimination.41
Historical consciousness, affirmative duty to protect, citizenship as the
goal of equality: all of these values come together in a single constellation to
guide the path of reconstruction. Buoyed by this expansive notion of
equality for blacks, the Northern Republicans enacted a panoply of civil
rights laws to protect the freed slaves. 42  This whole framework was
knocked into a cocked hat by the Supreme Court in the aftermath of
reconstruction.
Every normative framework comes into existence by suppressing
competing value systems. One of the projects of the reconstruction
Congress was the integration of inns and places of public accommodation.
They did this through the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The legislation
provided:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations,
advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on
land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement;
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law,
and applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless
of any previous condition of servitude.43
During the debate over the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Joshua Hill, a
Senator from Georgia, articulated for the opponents of reconstruction the
ideas which would later become the framework for Plessy and ultimately the
legitimization of segregation:
I must confess, sir, that I cannot see the magnitude of this subject. I
object to this great Government descending to the business of
regulating the hotels and the common taverns of this country, and
the street railroads, stage-coaches, and everything of that sort. It
40. Id. at 303.
41. Id.
42. These include The Civil Rights Act of 1866 declaring that "all citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State or Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property," (this becomes the
precursor to the Fourteenth Amendment), the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, prohibiting conspiracies by
state or private actors to prevent a person "from exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States," and The Civil Rights Act of 1875, prohibiting race discrimination in privately owned
places of public accommodation.
43. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Star. 336, was declared unconstitutional by the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
590
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looks to me to be a petty business for the Government of the United
States .... What he may term a right may be the right of any man
that pleases to come into my parlor and to be my guest. That is not
the right of any colored man upon earth, nor of any white man,
unless it is agreeable to me.
44
Hill argued that civil rights laws were an imposition.45  Hill's
framework centered on the right of an individual to freedom-freedom to
control his or her property, and to choose his or her associates.46 It could
also be thought of as a claim to a private sphere of life, beyond the reach of
government.47 Also, it was an argument about federalism: that the Federal
Government was an evil and had to be constrained within its plane of
power. 48 By talking about the fundamental right of individuals to liberty or
freedom, Hill invoked the lofty social contract on behalf of maintaining a
status quo that privileged whites.
In the upside-down moral universe of Hill and his brethren, civil rights
laws were a formidable evil because they threatened the foundations of the
Constitution. These foundations were threefold: liberty (i.e the social
contract itself), the right to control one's own property, and the Federal
Government as a government of enumerated powers. 49  "This classical
approach made no challenge to the command that all citizens be treated
equally, but it did make the severest effort to constrain its boundaries and
scope, limiting its meaning to a certain public sphere of life."5 ° All of these
values formed points within the constellation of values of the Southern
opposition.
But there was another star in this constellation of concepts: the point
that blacks were an inferior race of people. Hill stated, "[i]t is not the fault
44. D. Marvin Jones, No time for Trumpets: Title VII, Equality, and the Fin de Siecle, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 2311, 2329 (1994) (quoting 50 CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871) (remarks of
Sen. Hill)).
45. See id. For an analysis of the use of "imposition language" in reform efforts such as "blacks
struggle for equal opportunity," see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Imposition, 35 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1025 (1994). When Delgado uses the term imposition he refers to it as a narrative, as
a set of assumptions underlying the thinking of one side of a political debate. See id. at 1026. 1 take
this a step further and argue that the concept of imposition best describes a particular theory of
equality, one side in a judicial debate. This concept in different variations has bedeviled blacks
since reconstruction.
46. See Jones, supra note 44, at 2329.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 2330 (emphasis added).
of the race that, socially, they are not the equals of the white race to-day; nor
is it incumbent upon every philanthropist to devote every spare hour to the
elevation of the race."'" This was old wine in new bottles: this was the Dred
Scott philosophy reborn.
2
Hill was eloquently opposed by Senator Sumner.5 3 He claimed in effect
that the social contract cut the other way. Sumner argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment made blacks citizens.5 4 Citizens! In Sumner's view the right to
access to public accommodation, in effect the integration of all citizens in
civil society, flowed from the concept of citizenship itself: "The Senator
may choose his associates as he pleases .... That taste which the Senator
has now declared belongs to him he will have free liberty to exercise
always . . . but when it comes to rights, there the Senator must obey the
law."1
55
Hill and his side lost the debate in 1871.56 But after reconstruction
ended the Supreme Court wrote Hill's philosophy into law.5 ' Now why was
the reconstruction framework-the will of Congress--overturned by the
Supreme Court? Antonio Gramsci in his prison notebooks observed that
"when the State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once
revealed. The State was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a
powerful system of fortresses and earthworks. 58 There is a similar story to
be told about the overthrow of slavery in the United States: while slavery
was overthrown as a structure of laws and official practices, the ideology
that supported slavery was largely intact.
I need to make a point here about how this ideology seeps into the
judicial process. Most people think of racism as something that involves
decisions.5 9 Gordon Allport, writing on the nature of race prejudice, stated
51. 50 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Hill).
52. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Dred Scott decision).
53. See 50 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Sumner).
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Jones, supra note 44, at 2330.
57. Id. (citing Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
58. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMScI 494
(Q. Hoare & G. Smith trans., 1971) (emphasis added).
59. This is the central premise of the intent model in constitutional law. According to Professor
Blumstein:
[T]he nondiscrimination notion is a procedural concept assuring evenhanded treatment of
similarly situated individuals .... [I]t is breached when similarly situated people are
treated differently because of their race. Such differential treatment has an essential
ingredient of volition, and a finding of unconstitutional discrimination therefore rests on a
finding of intent.
James F. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purposes vs.
Results Approach From the Voting Rights Act, 69 VA. L. REV. 633, 643 (1983) (emphasis added).
By "volition," Blumstein is referring to the exercise of will-the basic element of a conscious
decision. See id.
592
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that prejudice-racism-happens when an individual makes irrational
inferences on the basis of the neutral fact of race.6 ° I have spent at least
fifteen years studying the concept of race. The culmination of my research
is that, contrary to Allport's position, race has a meaning: it is simply a
collage of stories, stereotypes, and ideology, almost always denigrating to
blacks. The meaning of race in the nineteenth century was that "blackness"
was a badge of difference and inferiority. 61 Taney was right on that point in
terms of social views, though wrong I think on how blacks should be viewed
in the eyes of the law.
As I have stated in my many articles and my recent book,62 the problem
of discrimination comes about when people mistake race, which is a fiction,
for a fact.63 Many writers have written that stereotyping is a problem of
individuals acting based on unconscious biases.64 This is not my approach.
Racism is a social practice. Traditionally, it is not unconscious. 65  Judges
60. See GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF RACE PREDJUDICE 261-81 (1954). Allport develops
the hypothesis that racism is an irrational response to the neutral fact of race. He goes on to
hypothesize that these attitudes flourish in a social environment of racial separation and ignorance.
See id.
61. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
62. D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX, AND SUSPICION: THE MYTH OF THE BLACK MALE (2005).
63. See generally id.
64. Cf ALLPORT, supra note 60.
65. It is not unconscious,
[a]t least not in a Freudian sense. The problem here is that the Freudian framework relies
on the processes within the individual to explain behavior. As a structuralist, I don't
believe this gives us a meaningful account of the problem. I see discrimination as a
social and historical phenomenon linked to language. Langauge, in a structuralist sense,
may also be thought of as "unconscious," but not in the way the conventional account has
oversimplified it.
The . . . unconscious is therefore not so much that dark inner reservoir of desire and
instinct which used to be our image of the Freudian id, occasionally breaking into the
realm of consciousness or insinuating its way there through the disguises of dreams.
Rather, it is an absolute transparency, an order which is unconscious simply because it is
infinitely vaster than our individual minds, and because they owe their development to
their positions within it.
Jones, supra note 24, at 446 n.35 (quoting FREDERICK JAMESON, THE PRISON HOUSE OF LANGUAGE
137-38 (1972)).
It's wrong to think that the unconscious exists because of the existence of unconscious
desire, of some obtuse, heavy caliban, indeed animal unconscious desire that rises up
from the depths, ... and has to lift itself to the higher level of consciousness. Quite on
the contrary, desire exists because there is unconsciousness, that is to say, language
which escapes the subject . . . and because there is always, on the level of language,
something which is beyond consciousness ....
Id. (quoting Frederick Jameson, The Prison House of Language 137-38 (1972)). Proponents of
affirmative action traditionally tried to justify it on the basis of societal discrimination. One reason
and others have openly and explicitly embraced racism as "reasonable. 66
We will see this in Plessy, where the Court was racist, and smugly SO. 6 7 The
operative element is race as a concept within our language and culture. Race
is a web of cultural images, meaning, ideas and presuppositions. Our legal
culture and our social culture are not distinct. Judges bring their images of
black people with them into the courtroom. The characteristics of the
fictional subject are conflated with the real person. Racism in law is
primarily conflation, the inability to distinguish between the individual-
who is "real"-and the racial image-which is imaginary. Plessy is a classic
case.
The Plessy case 68 involved an 1890 Louisiana statute that required
railroads to segregate passengers on the basis of race. 69 Because this was a
Louisiana state law, state action was clear. The Court accepted that a prima
facie case of discrimination had been made out and framed the issue in terms
of reasonableness. Plessy answered this challenge to blatant
discrimination explicitly, with racial ideology. Recall that the issue in
Plessy was simply whether the racial discrimination required by the
Louisiana statute was reasonable. 71 The Supreme Court's answer was, of
course it is. 72 The Court simply assumed that racial distinctions are natural
and therefore beyond the reach of legislation:
73
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature
of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions
societal discrimination is rejected as a justification is that it is in tension with the Freudian and
individualistic conception of discrimination. See id. Cf Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, The Ego,
and Equal Protection Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
66. Reasonable racism is the view that the stereotypes are true. Examples include: blacks are
prone to crime, blacks are inferior in intelligence, etc. In my book I argue that the post-civil-rights-
era resegregation and the ideology of black inferiority are intertwined: it is the result of a breakdown
of consensus that had tentatively existed in the Brown era. See JONES, supra note 62. Examples of
"reasonable" racism today include: racial profiling by police; the disparate portrayal of black and
white victims of Hurricane Katrina; the claim by Richard Sander that gaps in test scores reflect
systematic inferiority of blacks as a class, see Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative
Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367 (2004) (blaming test scores on cultural
peculiarities, specifically poor parenting); Bill Cosby's embrace of stereotypes of the black poor; and
the neoconservative claim that the underclass are to blame for their own conditions. These are all
examples of a burgeoning resurgence of classic essentializing of blacks.
67. See infra notes 68-75, 80-81 and accompanying text.
68. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
69. Id. at 537.
70. See id. at 549-50.
71. Id. at 550.
72. Id. at 550-51.
73. Id. at 551-52. The Court explicitly held that it is natural and within the police powers of the
state to regulate race, and implicitly held that it is unnatural for the Federal Government, by means
of the Equal Protection Clause, to intervene in the state's regulatory scheme. Id.
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based upon color, . . . but, when this great principle comes to be
applied to the actual and various conditions of persons in society, it
will not warrant the assertion, that men and women are legally
clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that children
and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject to
the same treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled
and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal
consideration and protection of the law for their maintenance and
security."
Race is so natural a difference that it is, in context, as reasonable to
segregate cars on a train as it is to segregate the sexes in public bathrooms.
While Plessy did not explicitly characterize these natural racial differences,
the meaning of segregation both in Plessy and the many instances of state
sponsored segregation to follow was that blacks occupied a lower place-a
lower caste if you will-than whites.
Radicals readily recognized . . . that blacks were already
practically ... segregated, but to Radicals the laws were useful in
showing explicitly and blatantly the power of whites. They were
tokens of hard and present truths and signs of things to come--of
the surety of white supremacy and the futility of black resistance.1
5
Dubois, in Black Reconstruction, went so far as to characterize the
primary function of segregation as a system that paid whites in the wages of
race-based privilege, white privilege if you will.7 6 This framework of racial
segregation as natural was knotted together with the correlative idea that the
citizenship rights of blacks naturally did not extend to the social realm. The
social realm was a private sphere beyond the reach of federal civil rights
protections.
As Jack Balkin wrote, "[c]ivil and political equality were guaranteed,
but social equality was still different, because a person's social status among
74. Id. at 544.
75. JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION 225 (1984).
76. W.E. BURGHARDT DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA, 1860-1866 (Free Press
1998) (1935). White privilege is the pervasive, structural, and generally invisible assumption that
white people define a norm and black people are "other," dangerous, and inferior. Sylvia Law,
White Privilege and Affirmative Action, 32 AKRON L. REV. 603, 604 (2003).
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his or her fellow citizens is formed by private interactions in a private sphere
of association. ' 77
Not only does Plessy say that segregation is natural, but there is also the
notion that the subordination of blacks is inevitable because of their
inferiority. Thus, Justice Harlan, though dissenting, states, as if in unison
with the Court on the issue of inferiority, "[t]he white race deems itself to be
the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements,
in education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage. 78 Of course, if whites are
the naturally superior race, not only are whites absolved from moral
responsibility-their superior position in society is inevitable-but also
blacks are the cause for their own degradation. The fault is in their gene
pool. Thus, another star in this constellation of concepts is social
Darwinism.
In one case, Plessy knots together the philosophy of Joshua Hill,79
which paints civil rights protections as an encroachment or imposition on a
sphere of autonomy preserved to the individual,8 ° with the philosophy of
Dred Scott, which had originally held blacks to be inferior,8' and the
philosophy of social, or really racial, Darwinism.
Individualism, liberty, and white privilege are combined in one
constellation of values. This is what I call "equality as imposition." The
function of this framework was to portray black rights claims as unnatural
and contrary to the basic ideals of this country, and to portray blacks as
undeserving of judicial intervention. Their equality claims thus represent an
imposition. It was this notion of equality that upheld segregation from 1896
to 1954.
Brown82 clearly rejected segregation, but on what theory it did so is not
clear. Our current debate about affirmative action is about the interpretation
of Brown. What theory of equality did Brown embrace? Many scholars
argue Brown was premised on a substantive theory of equality, and on a
concern about conditions of blacks as a group. There are two branches of
this theory. The effects model looks at the causal nexus between race and
conditions in society.
On point, the Court noted that "[t]o separate [the black students] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
77. Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play In Three Acts, 26 CARDOZO L. REv.
1689, 1700 (2005).
78. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
79. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5,
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their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 83  To
underscore the Court's concern with social outcomes or social effects, the
Court went on to cite social science research that documented the harm of
segregation to black children or blacks as a group. 84 This type of argument
still exists in Title VII law, nominally. Under this theory blacks should not
suffer any form of oppression or be made to suffer because they are black.
Intent is not the issue under this model: impact is.
Some commentators go further to argue that we must not only be
concerned about the social impact of present policies, but that we have an
affirmative duty to eliminate racial caste. Thus, Cass Sunstein states, "the
anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices from translating highly
visible and morally irrelevant differences into systematic social
disadvantage.""S  Also, Owen Fiss stated, "what is critical ... is that the
state law or practice aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of
a specially disadvantaged group. 86  In addition, according to Dorothy
Roberts, "the anti-subordination approach considers the concrete effects of
government policy on the substantive condition of the disadvantaged. 8 7
I think this is the heart of Brown. This concern with "them," with black
children, with the plight of innocent victims, with social "impact," and with
arguably the issue of caste, places Brown squarely in the framework of
equality as "redemption," an expansive notion of equality.
An interpretive corollary here is that the Brown case flowed from a legal
realist understanding that history, specifically the sordid history of
segregation, must inform our reading of the constitution. Of course, the
same opinion can be read narrowly. I think a narrow reading would be
83. Id. at 494.
84. Id. (citing K. B. Clark, EFFECT OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION ON PERSONALITY
DEVELOPMENT (Midcentury White House Conference on Children and Youth, 1950); WITMER
KOTINSKY, PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (1952), c. VI; Deutscher and Chein, The Psychological
Effects of Enforced Segregation: A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26 J. PSYCHOL. 259 (1948);
Chein, What are the Psychological Effects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3
INT. J. OPINION AND ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); THEODORE BRAMELD, Educational Costs, IN
DISCRIMINATION AND NATIONAL WELFARE (Maclver ed., 1949), 44-48; EDWARD FRANKLIN
FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES 674-681 (1949); and GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944)).
85. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2411.
86. Fiss, supra note 32, at 157.
87. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1453-54 (1991); see also Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 146 (1987); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 659; David A. Strauss, The Myth of
Colorblindness, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 99 (1986).
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wrong, but there is a slender reed of language for conservatives to hold onto.
The Court stated:
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the
policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law,
therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental
development of negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system. 88
Thus, conservatives argue that Brown is about the permissible
boundaries of government decisions. Edwin Meese states, "if we can
preserve the even-handed decisions through which the Supreme Court has
moved us toward a color-blind society, then we really will have approached
a new frontier in civil rights and in overall prosperity. 89 In effect, Brown
creates a line beyond which government may not go, and a class of
considerations that are impermissible for government to use. Richard Posner
contends "that the proper constitutional principle is ... no use of racial or
ethnic criteria to determine the distribution of government benefits and
burdens." 90
This focus on decisions is knotted together with the premise that equal
protection rights are personal or individual rights-a counterpoint to a focus
on groups. Individuals have no history as such. It follows that by focusing
narrowly on the parties before the court, the conservatives find that historical
context and social outcomes are irrelevant. Equality is reduced normatively
to a concern about specific identifiable decisions. This precisely fits the
narrative that black claims for group rights are unnatural and challenge the
foundations of a liberal legal system, which is based on the rights of the
individual. This is "equality as imposition." Richard Delgado talks about
"imposition" as a political narrative. 91  He describes the narrative
eloquently:
We march, link arms, and sing with the newcomers, identifying
with their struggle. At some point, however, reaction sets in. We
decide the group has gone far enough. At first, justice seemed to be
88. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (quoting the lower court's decision in the Kansas case).
89. Edwin Meese III, Civil Rights, Economic Progress, and Common Sense, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 150, 156 (1991).
90. Richard Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of
Racial Minorities, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 22 (1974).
91. Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 45, at 1026.
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on their side. But now we see them as imposing, taking the
offensive, asking for concessions they do not deserve. Now they
are the aggressors, and we the victims .... We decide the group is
asking for "special" status. We find their demands excessive,
tiresome, or frightening.
92
In the story of the Amistad, the sailors sailed back and forth between
Africa and America. 9 3  Like the Amistad, the discourse of equality has
swung back and forth between these two constellations of values. During
the period following Brown these two constellations of values seesawed
back and forth.
For example, in 1972 the Court decided Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
94
which was premised largely on the anti-caste principle that one cannot
perpetuate segregation. 95 But the Supreme Court cases since 1988 have
fallen into line: they may all be grouped around this post-civil rights
narrative. This new narrative of imposition is merely a variation on the
themes articulated first by Joshua Hill, 96 and later by Plessy.97
Let us start with the Croson case. 98  First, the Court emphatically
limited the unit of inquiry to the individual, concluding that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments protect persons, not groups.99  Thus all
governmental action based on race-a group classification-should be
subjected to detailed judicial scrutiny to ensure that the individual right to
Equal Protection has not been infringed.
Individuals have no group history. The minorities argued that strict
scrutiny should not apply the same way when blacks are involved because of
their unique experience with slavery and segregation. The Court in Croson
rejected this context-specific application of Equal Protection in favor of a
Universalist view.'00  "There is only one Equal Protection Clause. It
requires every state to govern impartially. It does not direct the courts to
92. Id. (footnote omitted).
93. See William G. Ross, The Legal Career of.John Quincy Adams, 23 AKRON L. REV. 415, 446-
47(1998).
94. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
95. See id.
96. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text; Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 791, 800 (1996).
97. See supra notes 68-75, 79-80 and accompanying text.
98. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989).
99. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
100. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 494.
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apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other
cases."''
1 1
The Court's rejection of historical context surfaced again at another
stage of the Court's analysis. Having found strict scrutiny appropriate the
Court then had to decide what constitutes a justification. The City of
Richmond argued that "societal discrimination," that is the historic and
present injustice blacks face or the unlevel playing field justified affirmative
action.' °2 Continuing its arc of individualism and particularity, the Court
found these appeals to social and historical context either irrelevant or
beyond the ken of courts to address. 10 3  "Justice Powell contrasted the
'focused' goal of remedying 'wrongs worked by specific instances of racial
discrimination' with 'the remedying of the effects of societal discrimination,
an amorphous concept of injury that may be ageless in its reach into the
past. ,1,, 104
Social Darwinism crept in again. The Court suggested that statistical
disparities, by themselves, mean nothing:
The city and the District Court also relied on evidence that MBE
membership in local contractors' associations was extremely low.
Again, standing alone this evidence is not probative of any
discrimination in the local construction industry. There are
numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation,
including . . . both black and white career and entrepreneurial
choices. 105
Effects, social outcomes, and results didn't matter; it was simply a question
of whether the decisional process was fair no matter the outcome. This is
purely procedural equality.
A corollary here is that the court was skeptical of whether the necessary
causal link between race and disproportionate exclusion was present;
instead, it could have been blacks' own fault: "[T]he 30% quota cannot be
said to be narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial
balancing. It rests upon the 'completely unrealistic' assumption that
minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their
101. Id. at 514 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1976)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
102. Id. at 470.
103. Id. at 507.
104. Id. at 496-97.
105. Id. at 503.
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representation in the local population." 106  "Blacks may be
disproportionately attracted to industries other than construction."' 07
In its ahistorical approach, its individualism, and its social Darwinism,
Croson mirrors the constellation of concepts framed by Plessy.'0 8 And it
also hints, in the spirit of Plessy, that the problem of blacks may be natural;
maybe they would rather play basketball than be entrepreneurs.
Hopwood v. Texas'0 9 flowed directly from Croson. Prior to Hopwood,
Regents of University of California v. Bakke" ° had been the law. Bakke
recognized diversity as a compelling justification for affirmative action."'
But Croson limited race conscious measures to specific instances of
identified, i.e. proven, discrimination. "2 Race, as a rule, was both an
irrelevant an impermissible consideration. Hopwood fell into line with
Croson, holding that "[t]he use of [race] even as part of the consideration of
a number of factors, is unconstitutional."" 1
3
Grutter"14 was hailed as a victory" 5 simply because it reversed
Hopwood and restored the Bakke "permission." The case arose when the
University of Michigan School of Law rejected Barbara Grutter, a white
female with a 3.8 grade point average and a 161 LSAT score.116 She argued
she was denied admission because race, rather than her objective
qualifications, was a "predominant" factor in her non-selection. "7 She
challenged not only the policy at the University of Michigan's law school,
but also the long standing precedent in Bakke."' The 1978 decision in
Bakke, written by Justice Powell, famously held that while all race-
conscious programs were subject to strict scrutiny and required, inter alia, a
compelling justification, the need for diversity in admissions justified the
106. Id. at 507.
107. Id. at 503.
108. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
109. 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
110. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
111. Id.
112. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
113. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-46.
114. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
115. See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CAL. L. REV. 261 (2006); see also Elaine
Jones, Luck Was Not a Factor: The Importance of a Strategic Approach to Civil Rights Litigation,
11 AsIAN L.J. 290 (2004).
116. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316.
117. Id. at 317.
118. Id. at 323; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
consideration of race. " 9 Grutter is widely touted as a victory because it
rejected the "heresy" of Hopwood and affirmed that Powell's decision was
the law; it affirmed a qualified right of even state-run law schools to
consider race under the auspices of "diversity." 2 0
The starting point in locating Grutter within the heaven of our
constitutional discourse is to appreciate the tension between diversity and
affirmative action.
Blacks' claims to affirmative action are claims generally for
compensatory justice, and are arguably reparational. These are historically
grounded, backward looking, and focused on the harm experienced by
blacks. They seek to end "second class citizenship." This is an extension of
the constellation of values traced by Lincoln in the nineteenth century. 12
Diversity represents a rejection of all historically grounded injustice
claims, as well as all appeals to social engineering. "We are not social
engineers," Chief Justice Roberts wrote in Seattle. 122 Diversity has its roots
in liberal individualism, and the need of the individual for an environment in
which there can be a robust exchange of ideas. Diversity is a concession
from within the framework of "imposition"; it allows blacks in but only to
the extent it serves the goals of white privilege.
As Charles Lawrence has stated, the "diversity defense" of affirmative
action is, in effect, conservative. 1
23
The liberal or "diversity" defense articulates its purpose as
"forward-looking" . . . it begins with an implicit denial of the
defender's ... responsibility for past or contemporary racism. The
university seeks to prepare its students for future ... leadership in a
racially diverse society and expresses no interest in reparations. By
looking only forward, it avoids . . . admission . . . of . . . past
discriminatory practices, even when that discrimination is de jure
and of relatively recent vintage. This denial ... reiterates "the big
lie," the anti-affirmative action argument that pretends that white
supremacy is extinct and presupposes a color-blind world. 124
This is Grutter's starting point.
Grutter mirrors Croson in its hierarchy of values. It is in the first
instance a quintessentially individualistic opinion prizing individualized
determinations and railing against any program that distributes benefits on
119. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 330.
120. Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
121. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
122. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2779 (2007).
123. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 932.
124. Id. at 953-54.
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the basis of membership in a group. Once again the court adopted the
perspective of Justice Powell. 125  "In Justice Powell's view, when
governmental decisions touch upon an individual's race or ethnic
background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is
asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest." 
126
The reference to the individual invokes the social contract and the very
foundations of the liberal legal system as a barrier: preferential treatment on
the basis of race is an impermissible end.
As in Croson, the Court appealed to a lofty universalism at the expense
of taking into account the lived experience of black people for purposes of
determining how strictly the Equal Protection Clause should be applied.
1 7
The Court- repeated Powell's aphorism that "there are not two equal
protection clauses."' 128  Universalism erases the uniqueness of blacks' lived
experiences. Through this universalism, as in Croson, the Court equated
affirmative action programs with the segregated schools in Brown. Barbara
Grutter's injury from the University of Michigan's use of race is just as
serious as the injury to Linda Brown. For blacks, discrimination can be a
soul-murdering, scaldingly humiliating experience. I wonder if Barbara
Grutter went to get counseling.
But Grutter is more conservative in its reasoning than this. The central
figure in the framework of "imposition" is the figure of the innocent white
victim. As Joshua Hill had posed the figure of the white property owner
dispossessed from his "parlor" because of intrusive civil rights laws, 29 the
court in Grutter posed the figure of the innocent white victim. Such
125. Professor Levine argues that O'Connor goes beyond Powell's "educational value" rationale.
"O'Connor... said that developing good citizens is a benefit that flows from affirmative action and
fits within a university's social role. All of this goes beyond the 'educational benefits of diversity'
interest articulated by Powell that supposedly is all that O'Connor 'endorse[d]."' See Joshua M.
Levine, Stigma's Opening: Grutter's Diversity Interest(s) and the New Calculus for Affirmative
Action in Higher Education, 94 CAL. L. REV. 457, 470 (2006). Nonetheless, the great thrust of
O'Connor's argument frames affirmative action as something justified by its benefit to whites and
the larger society as opposed to something focused on addressing social wrongs suffered by blacks.
The common theme here and with O'Connor's explicit reference to harming innocent whites is that
it studiously ignores black historical experiences as irrelevant.
126. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323.
127. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
128. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 ("Justice Powell began by stating that '[t]he guarantee of equal
protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied
to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal."'
(quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978))).
129. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
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measures would risk placing unnecessary burdens on innocent third parties
"who bear no responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the
special admissions program are thought to have suffered."130
Michigan does retain its diversity program but at the expense of
affirming the narrative of imposition that was the very spirit of Plessy. The
coup de grace is the recent Seattle case.' 3' The Seattle case exposes the
exact core of the explosive affirmative action debate. The stakes are so high
in that case because of the stark pattern of resegregation that is emerging
fifty years after Brown.
American schools are still nearly as segregated as they were 50
years ago. Almost three-quarters of African-American students are
currently in schools that are more than 50% black and Latino, while
the average white student goes to a school that is 80% white,
according to a 2001 study by the National Center for Education
Statistics. Similarly, a 2003 study by the Civil Rights Project at
Harvard found that 27 of the nation's largest urban school districts
are 'overwhelmingly' black and Latino, and segregated. The
percentage of white students going to school with black students is
"lower in 2000 than it was in 1970 before busing for racial balance
began".... 132
This pattern of resegregation did not just happen. It flowed directly from the
mischief of Rehnquist Court decisions since the late 1980s.1
33
The Rehnquist Court issued a trilogy of opinions that severely limited
130. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310).
131. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
132. Juan Williams, The Legacy of Little Rock, TIME, Oct. 1, 2007, at 61.
133. Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Educational Equity in the
wake of Grutter, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 176 (2005).
134. Id. The first case was Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
In Dowell, the Court held that once a "unitary" system could be established, a federal
court's desegregation order should end, even if this meant a resegregation of schools.
The Court held that school boards need only show they complied in "good faith" and that
"the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable."
Epperson, supra note 133, at 185 (footnotes omitted). The second shoe to fall was Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
[T]he Court held that once a district complied with a portion of a desegregation order, a
federal court should cease to monitor that portion and remain involved only as to those
aspects of the plan that have yet to be achieved. This allowed for the piecemeal
dismantling of desegregation orders across the South.
Epperson, supra note 133 at 185 (footnotes omitted). Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995), was
the capstone of the trilogy.
[T]he Court established the requirement that lower courts must specify exactly what
educational deficits are traceable to segregation and discrimination, and what results will
be required as proof that the deficits are remedied. If such specification is absent, Jenkins
gives courts the license to return school districts to local control, thus allowing
604
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the circumstances, means, and duration of desegregation remedies, stated its
desire to end federal court supervision, and invoked the common mantra of
restoring control to local school systems. The lie behind this glorification of
local control is similar to the Court's embrace of "color blindness" in many
other contexts. It is a standard that treats whites and blacks as if they were
similarly situated and ignores the history of segregation and its vestiges that
have been such unique and intrinsic threads in the American tapestry. This
form of local control allowed segregation to flourish in the era before
Brown, and has done so again in the decade since these decisions.135
The only tool schools have left after this trio of cases is the tool of
voluntary affirmative action. 13 6 As Ted Shaw stated:
What these school districts were trying to do was overlay on all that
choice the imperative to maintain some diversity or some degree of
integration. You know, all that's left of Brown v. Board of
Education, for the most part, is voluntary integration, and days of
mandatory busing are all but over. '37
The absence of alternatives is particularly clear in the Seattle and
Louisville cases. Both areas have a troubled history with respect to
segregation:
In both Seattle and Louisville, the local school districts began with
schools that were highly segregated in fact. In both cities plaintiffs
filed lawsuits claiming unconstitutional segregation. In Louisville,
a federal district court found that school segregation reflected pre-
Brown state laws separating the races. In Seattle, the plaintiffs
alleged that school segregation unconstitutionally reflected not only
generalized societal discrimination and residential housing patterns,
but also school board policies and actions that had helped to create,
maintain, and aggravate racial segregation. In Louisville, a federal
documented inequities to persist.
Epperson, supra note 133at 186 (footnotes omitted).
135. See Epperson, supra note 133
136. See In Landmark Ruling, Supreme Court Strikes Down Voluntary Desegregation in Public
Schools, DEMOCRACY NOW, June 29, 2007, http://www.democracynow.org/2007/6/29/
inlandmarkmrulingsupreme-court-strikes [hereinafter DEMOCRACY NOW].
137. Id.
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court entered a remedial decree. In Seattle, the parties settled after
the school district pledged to undertake a desegregation plan. 138
However, over the years Louisville was found unitary 3 9 and so by the
time of the lawsuit both cities were innocent of formal, or de jure,
discrimination. Without this factual predicate voluntary integration was the
only game in town. Voluntary integration took place in Seattle and
Louisville schools, where race was used as a tie breaker. 140  At schools
where the racial imbalance was "out of whack," the school boards
voluntarily allowed race to "break the tie" between students in the same
district. 141
Ironically, in Seattle there was even a question of busing children away
from their own neighborhoods. As Ted Shaw stated:
These cases out of Seattle, Washington and Louisville, Kentucky
didn't involve white parents who were suing because they were
being sent to schools further away from home. There were broad
choice elements, where students were choosing schools within their
districts on a number of factors: the programs that were at those
schools, the reputations of the schools. 1
42
With the last hope-the last tool of desegregation at stake-the issue
turned on whether the use of race was seen as remedial or as an act of
discrimination. 14
3
In which category to put the affirmative action in this case depends on
our understanding of what segregation is. If segregation is racial imbalance,
the schools in Seattle and Louisville were resegregating and there was a
basis to argue for a remedy. 144 However, if segregation is racial imbalance
combined with the proven sanction of law, then there was no such proof. 145
The debate is over defining the harm of segregation. This takes us back to
138. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2802 (2007) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
139. Id. at 2740. In 2000, the district court that entered that decree dissolved it, finding that
Jefferson County had "eliminated the vestiges associated with the former policy of segregation and
its pernicious effects," and thus had achieved "unitary" status. Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358,360 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
140. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2747-50.
141. Id.
142. DEMOCRACY Now, supra note 136.
143. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2752.
144. Id.
145. Id.
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the divide between effects and intent,146 universalism versus context,147 true
equality or equality discerned through the narrative of imposition. 1
48
In Seattle, the Supreme Court placed its sanction on the view that the
harm is the tainted decision.149 "[T]he harm being remedied by mandatory
desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that the
Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without
more."' 50 The Court went on to make this point as sharp as a razor: "It was
not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating children
on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitutional
violation in 1954. "15 The Court concluded: "[a]t most, [the present]
statistics show a national trend toward classroom racial imbalance.
However, racial imbalance without intentional state action to separate the
races does not amount to segregation."
52
Using the Court's analysis, the dissent criticized that the Court was
"feeling confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end all
governmental use of race-conscious criteria.""' 3  The Supreme Court
justified this formal reading on the grounds that it is necessary to prevent a
floodgate of affirmative action:
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would
justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American
society, contrary to our repeated recognition that "at the heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple
command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals,
not as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual or national
class." 154
Once again the individual, read here as the innocent white victim, stands on
the tension bridge between where we are and a future of social justice.
But the individual constructed by the Supreme Court is incredibly
ahistorical. In Brown, everyone agreed black children were stigmatized by
the segregation laws. This was the point of the Kenneth Clark doll
146. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 101-06, 128-29 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 45-47, 80-81, 91-92, 96-97, 130 and accompanying text.
149. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2752.
150. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977)).
151. Id. at2767.
152. Id. at 2769.
153. Id. at 2833 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 2757 (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995)).
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study"'55-black children were made to feel inferior, and it was on this basis
that the Court overruled Plessy: 156 "To separate them from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
1 57
The Court left no doubt who "them" is: "[s]egregation of white and
colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored
children."158 In the face of this uncontested history, the Court now frames
the issue as if the race of the children in Brown was irrelevant.
"Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could
not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in
these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we
should allow this once again--even for very different reasons." '159 As the
Court revises Brown it becomes incoherent. Of course the race of the
children mattered-it was black children who were made to feel inferior. As
Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent:
This . . . reminds me of Anatole France's observation: "The
majestic equality of the law, forbids rich and poor alike to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." THE
CHIEF JUSTICE fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren
who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of
white children struggling to attend black schools. 160
The crowning point that confirms this pattern is the Court's skepticism,
not only about intent, but the causal nexus: whether the racism of past
segregation has anything to do with the escalating racial isolation of today.
This is critical because even if you assume it is only state sponsored
segregation that matters, not imbalance in itself, there is a thin line between
"accidental" isolation of blacks and intentional segregation. The threshold
question is: did race cause the isolation? The Court never asks the question.
Justice Thomas simply shrugs, as if this were simple, assuming that when
state sponsored segregation occurs there is usually a statute around. This
reductionism reflects the social Darwinism of the twenty-first century. 1
61
Racial isolation may be as extreme as it was in 1950, and despite the
resemblance of this to apartheid, this is okay. I am reminded of Professor
155. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 US, 483, 494-95 n-11 (1954).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 494.
158. Id.
159. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
160. Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. See supra notes 78, 106 and surrounding text.
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Bryan Fair's aphorism that while the problem of the twentieth century was
the problem of the color line, the problem of the twenty-first century is the
problem of color-blindness. 162
III. CONCLUSION
It's gone. Not just affirmative action-the dream that we could
achieve an integrated society through the law. Everything we marched for.
Everything we fought so hard for in court.
The patterns of resegregation in law school and in public schools
cascade over our society like a rogue wave of injustice. Moreover, we lack
the tools, within the current constellation of constitutional discourse, to do
anything about it. True equality is as removed from us as the speeches of
Lincoln and Johnson and the quietly overruled decision of Brown.
We learn from the work of anthropologist Clifford Geertz that it is for
each generation to define the meaning of "we the people" and to determine
the spirit of the age. 163 Orfield asks in effect, "What is the spirit of our age?
Is it the spirit of Brown or is it the ghost of Plessy?"'
164
From Plessy to Croson, from Croson to Grutter, and from Grutter to
Seattle there is a mirroring of constitutional concepts: "Brown was not about
the harm to the hearts and minds of black children"; it was about the rights
of colorless individuals. "Universal values preclude claims of black
historical injustice." "The integrative ideal is no justification for social
engineering at the expense of the innocent white victim." The existence of
racial isolation does not matter. The fact that policies perpetuate racial caste
does not matter. The only thing that matters to the Court is the abstract
formalism of getting rid of race as a criteria. Since results do not matter, the
Court does not explain why racially isolated schools typically produce poor
outcomes for the students. Is it that there is an unstated assumption that
these outcomes for blacks are natural or inevitable? I can still hear Lincoln's
162. See Bryan K. Fair, Been in the Storm Too Long, Without Redemption: What We Must Do
Next, 25 S.U. L. Rev. 121, 124 (1997) ("[Iln race matters, the problem of the Twenty-first century
will be the problem of colorblindness-the refusal of legislators, jurists, and most of American
society-to acknowledge the causes and current effects of racial caste and to adopt effective
remedial policies to eliminate them."); see also W.E.B. Du BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK vii (2d
ed. 1953) (1903) ("[T]he problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line.").
163. See generally Clifford Geertz, Thinking as Moral Act: Ethical Dimensions of
Anthropological Fieldwork in the New States, in AVAILABLE LIGHT: ANTHROPOLOGICAL
REFLECTIONS ON PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS 21-41 (2000) (claiming that thinking cannot be abstracted
from action, and rejecting the idea of "objective knowledge").
164. See Orfield, supra note 19.
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words echoing down the corridors of history: "As I would not be a slave, so
I would not be a master .... Whatever differs from this . . . is no
democracy." 
165
What happened to that? What happened to the spirit of Brown?
165. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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